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NOTE
BREXIT AND THE WTO:
WHAT HAPPENS NEXT*
Andrea Xu**
In the summer of 2016, the United Kingdom (the “UK”) announced its
decision to leave the European Union (the “EU”).  This decision, more commonly
known as “Brexit,” subsequently stirred British politics, which included Theresa
May replacing David Cameron as Prime Minister.  Brexit created a unique situ-
ation in European and global politics, and instigated a discussion among politi-
cians, academics, economists, and the likes about how the UK will leave the EU
and Brexit’s implications in the UK, Europe, and the world as a whole.
This Note analyzes one specific aspect of Brexit: the administrative proce-
dures the UK must undergo to establish itself as an independent Member State in
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).  This Note solely focuses on the UK’s
Schedule of Concessions and considers three possible administrative proceedings
that address the UK’s challenges with its Schedule of Concessions.  This Note
advances the argument that the most realistic administrative proceeding will be
for the UK to de facto adopt the EU’s Schedule of Concessions under Article
XXVI:5(c) and invoke the UK’s right to reserve to renegotiate certain provisions
of its Schedule of Concessions under Article XXVIII of the 1947 General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (the “GATT”).  This procedure will allow the UK
greater freedom to choose its own trade policies and draft a Schedule of Conces-
sions in the shortest period, thus mitigating a potentially severe disruption in
international trade.
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INTRODUCTION
Immediately following Brexit, one of the most important and interest-
ing discussions has involved the consequential impact Brexit will have on
the UK’s trade relationships.  Some have argued that “the grittiest part of
the Brexit negotiations will be over trade.”1  The international trade com-
munity has especially focused on how Brexit has generated a complex situa-
tion within the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).  The WTO is the
only international organization2 that governs the rules of international
trade3 and decides how the international organization should treat the UK’s
WTO Member status.  The discussion surrounding the UK and the WTO
have primarily focused on the UK’s Schedule of Concessions, which reflects
the UK’s specific trade commitments to the WTO and its Member States,
and is arguably one of the most important aspects of the WTO.
Given how interdependent the global economy has become, the conse-
quences Brexit will have on the UK’s trade relationships constitutes a global
concern.  The uncertainty behind the UK’s legal status as a trading nation is
undetermined, and such uncertainty can have potentially severe economic
consequences for businesses and the price of goods.4
1. Brexit and Trade: Not so Simple, ECONOMIST (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.economist.
com/news/britain/21707251-britain-will-not-find-it-easy-strike-comprehensive-trade-deals-
quickly-not-so-simple.
2. An international organization can be defined as an “organization established by a
treaty or other instrument governed by international law and possessing its own international
legal personality.”  Members to an international organization are usually nation states. Inter-
national Organizations, PEACE PALACE LIBR., https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/research-guides/
international-organisations-and-relations/international-organizations/ (last visited Nov. 20,
2017).
3. What is the WTO?, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_
e.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2017).
4. Alan Beattie, Brexit and the WTO Option: Key Questions About a Looming Challenge,
FIN. TIMES (July 12, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/5741129a-4510-11e6-b22f-79eb4891c
97d; see also Peter Foster & James Kirkup, What Will Brexit Mean for British Trade?, TELEGRAPH
(Feb. 24, 2017, 10:21 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/what-would-brexit-mean-for-
british-trade/ (as an EU member, the UK can export and import goods to and from the EU
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This Note focuses on how the WTO should require the UK to create
tariff concessions and bindings in its Schedule of Concessions independent
of those of the EU, and addresses the challenges the UK may face during
this accession process.5  Although there has been discussion about the UK’s
ability to adopt a new Schedule of Concessions under a special procedure of
Article XXVI:5(c) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947
(“GATT”), this Note argues that the UK’s access to this special procedure
rests on the UK’s willingness to adopt the EU’s Schedule of Concessions in
its exact form.  Given the UK leaders’ desire to pursue an independent
trade agenda and WTO Director-General Roberto Azeveˆdo’s skepticism of
that procedure, this simple path may be more precarious.
Section I of this Note introduces the concept of global administrative
law, including this legal field’s significance in modern society as well as how
the WTO fits within this administrative space.  Section II provides a very
brief overview of Brexit, the WTO, and the EU.  Section III focuses on the
implications of Brexit and the WTO and touches upon why this novel issue
is of importance.  Section IV then provides three possible solutions to the
UK’s Schedule of Concessions within the WTO and proposes two other
possible administrative proceedings, other than adopting the procedure of
Article XXVI:5 of the GATT, that the WTO can initiate.
As previously mentioned, there may be two other possibilities for the
UK to adopt its Schedule of Concessions besides Article XXVI:5 of the
GATT.  First, the WTO could impose a de facto application of GATT Arti-
cle XXVI:5(c), which would allow the UK to adopt the EU’s Schedule of
Concessions as is and begin the UK’s accession process under GATT Article
XXXIII.6  Alternatively, the WTO could impose a de facto application of
GATT Article XXVI:5(c), but rather than beginning the UK’s accession
process under GATT Article XXXIII, the WTO could allow the UK to
reserve its right to renegotiate certain provisions of its Schedule of Conces-
sions under Article XXVIII of the GATT 1947.
and other countries with whom the EU has negotiated a free trade agreement without paying
a tariff. Post-Brexit, the UK will have to negotiate new deals to maintain these free trade
agreements).
5. For the purposes of this topic, this Note will only focus on tariff concessions and
bindings of the UK.  A tariff binding is a “commitment not to increase a rate of duty beyond
an agreed level.  Once a rate of duty is bound, it may not be raised without compensating the
affected parties.” Glossary Term: Tariff Binding, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e
/glossary_e/tariff_binding_e.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2017).
6. Accession, for purposes of this Note, refers to the UK independently negotiating
the contents of its Schedule of Concessions. Generally, accession is a process in which new
WTO Members negotiate their Schedule of Concessions with the existing WTO Member
States. How to Become a Member of the WTO, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
acc_e/acces_e.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2017).
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The third option—the UK de facto adopting the EU’s Schedule of Con-
cessions and preserving its right to negotiate under Article XXVIII of the
GATT—is the UK’s most favorable option and one that the UK should
advocate the WTO to permit.  Although this procedure is more complex
than a simple application of Article XXVI:5(c) of the GATT, it may give
the UK more trade independence when renegotiating its Schedule of
Concessions.
I. GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF BREXIT
AND THE WTO
Global administrative law (“GAL”) is a relatively young field of law that
reflects the increased globalization of society and “the emergence of a
‘global administrative space:’ a space in which the strict dichotomy between
domestic and international has largely broken down.”7  In other words,
GAL recognizes that many administrative and regulatory functions are now
performed on a global rather than national scale, and through a variety of
mediums, “ranging from binding decisions of international organizations to
non-binding agreements in intergovernmental networks and to domestic ad-
ministrative action in the context of global regimes.”8  GAL is thus a rather
fluid concept, and examples of what this legal field looks like in practice
includes World Bank rulemaking for developing countries and the WTO’s
governance of each country’s administrative decisions on import tariffs and
quotas.9
GAL attempts to address the consequences of globalized interdepen-
dence in fields such as trade in products and services.  Fields such as these
can no longer be adequately addressed solely by domestic regulatory and
administrative bodies because the production, assembly, and sale of a final
product may cross multiple international and domestic borders.10  One of
the challenges GAL thus seeks to solve is domestic officials engaging in
global rulemaking and implementing these rules domestically.11  Similarly,
domestic regulatory actions can conflict with a treaty or other international
obligations.12
7. Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and Global Ad-
ministrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2006).
8. Id. at 3.
9. Id.
10. See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 16 (2005).
11. See Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note 7, at 3.
12. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 10, at 19.
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The WTO falls within the global administrative space by administering
trade agreements through a body of lengthy and complex legal text.13  Since
WTO agreements are negotiated on an international level and implemented
on a domestic level, WTO Agreements and the WTO itself blend the inter-
national and domestic administrative spheres together:  these international
agreements both impact and are affected by the domestic countries’ political
and economic landscapes.
The UK’s decision to leave the EU serves as a noteworthy example of
this relationship between international and regulatory bodies and illustrates
the challenges seen in the global administrative space.  Brexit—a domestic
referendum—impacts the UK’s international obligations as a member of the
EU and the WTO.  While the UK’s withdrawal from the EU may initially
have been conducted on a domestic level (or at least, between the EU and
the UK), the UK’s membership in the WTO has complicated the with-
drawal process, creating legal complexity in both domestic and international
rulemaking.  How the WTO will administratively handle Brexit will thus
affect—adversely or not—the domestic economy of the UK and many other
Member States.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE UK, THE WHO, AND THE EU
In the summer of 2016, 51.9% of the UK voted to leave the EU.14  Ap-
proximately 71.8% of the population voted in the referendum.15  Following
the referendum, David Cameron resigned from his position as Prime Minis-
ter of the UK and was replaced by Theresa May, who served as Cameron’s
Home Secretary before becoming Prime Minister.16
The UK’s decision to leave the EU—also known as “Brexit”—ignited
heated discussion about the UK’s status in the WTO, and the implications
Brexit may have on the nation’s global trade.  As stated by Daniel Gue´guen,
head of strategy and lobbying at Pact European Affairs, “Brexit has now
become first and foremost a WTO matter.”17
It is well accepted that once the UK invokes Article 50 of the Lisbon
Treaty18 and officially leaves the EU, the UK must renegotiate several core
13. See id. at 16.
14. Alex Hunt & Brian Wheeler, Brexit: All You Need to Know about the UK Leaving the
EU, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887 (last visited Jan. 13, 2018).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Alberto Mucci et al., Forget Brussels, Brexit’s Toughest Battleground is the WTO, POLIT-
ICO (Oct. 6, 2016, 7:53 PM), http://www.politico.eu/article/forget-brussels-brexits-toughest-
battleground-is-the-wto-uk-theresa-may/.
18. Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union dictates that any Member State of the
European Union may withdraw from the European Union.  The Treaty also governs how the
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aspects of its WTO rights and obligations, specifically its Schedule of Con-
cessions.  What is particularly challenging for the UK’s WTO status is the
fact that while the UK is a WTO Member in its individual capacity (and
thus is not required to go through a formal accession process), its Schedule
of Concessions is fixed by its EU membership.  The UK’s situation is un-
precedented in the history of the WTO, and the question of how to proceed
has generated much discussion among politicians, lawyers, and academics.19
To understand the complicated situation Brexit has created within the
WTO, it is important to first understand the historical background of the
WTO.  The UK is a WTO Member and was also a GATT Member, an
agreement that preceded the WTO’s founding in 1995.20  The GATT was
signed in 1947 during a broader course of negotiations that tried (and
failed) to establish the International Trade Organization.  From 1948 to the
beginning of the WTO, the GATT was the principal international agree-
ment regulating trade between nations.  The GATT helped establish a
strong foundation for a multilateral trading system, but the system’s short-
comings eventually led way to the WTO after the Uruguay Round, which
were negotiations that took place from 1986 to 1994.21  Although the WTO
has replaced the GATT, the General Agreement is included as part of the
WTO Agreement for trade in goods and serves as the WTO Agreement’s
most substantial body of text.22
The WTO is an international organization comprised of countries serv-
ing as Member States.  The WTO is “the only global international organi-
zation dealing with the rules of trade between nations.”23  Broadly speaking,
the organization aims to reduce tariffs and other trade barriers by serving as
“a forum for governments to negotiate trade agreements . . . settle trade
Member State can withdraw from the European Union. Consolidated Version of the Treaty
on European Union art. 50, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 43-44.
19. See, e.g., Lorand Bartels, The UK’s Status in the WTO after Brexit, SSRN, Sept. 23,
2016, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2841747; Peter Ungphakorn,
Nothing Simple About UK Regaining WTO Status Post-Brexit, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINA-
BLE DEV., June 27, 2016, http://www.ictsd.org/opinion/nothing-simple-about-uk-regaining-
wto-status-post-brexit; C.W., Why the “WTO Option” for Brexit Will Prove Tricky, ECONOMIST,
Jan. 9, 2017, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2017/01/economist-ex
plains-4.
20. United Kingdom and the WTO, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coun
tries_e/united_kingdom_e.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2017).
21. William Davey, The World Trade Organization: A Brief Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW 87, 87–90 (Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds., 3d ed. 2016).
22. See Understanding the WTO: Basics - The Uruguay Round, WTO, https://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2017); see
also Joost H.B. Pauwelyn et al., Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, in INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE LAW 102, 102 (Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds., 3d ed. 2016).
23. What Is the WTO?, supra note 3.
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disputes. . . [and] operate a system of trade rules.”24  The WTO’s core lies
in the WTO Agreements, which are agreements negotiated and signed by
the majority of the world’s trading nations and ratified in those nations’
parliaments.25  Since the WTO aims to be a member-driven organization,
Member States make collective decisions that the WTO acts on when the
Member States reach a general agreement.26  The WTO was born out of
negotiations.  Thus, all WTO actions result from negotiations, including
the WTO Schedule of Concessions.27
The WTO Schedule of Concessions reflects “specific tariff concessions
and other commitments that [individual Member governments] have given
in the context of trade negotiations, such as the Uruguay Round.”28  All
WTO Members must agree upon the Schedule of Concessions, and each
Member must keep its applied tariff rates at or below the agreed-upon
rate.29  States can agree to modify their Schedules through negotiations
under GATT Article XXVIII.30
The EU has been a WTO Member since January 1, 1995 and is a single
customs union with a single trade policy and tariff. What is unique about
the EU within the WTO is that while its twenty-eight Member States are
individually WTO Members, the European Commission—the executive
body of the EU—negotiates on behalf of all EU Member States at almost
all WTO meetings.31
The UK is a Member State of the EU and, as previously mentioned,
has been a GATT Member since January 1, 1948.  As a member of the EU,
24. Who We Are, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_
e.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2017).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Understanding the WTO: Basics - What Is the World Trade Organization?, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited Nov. 21,
2017).
28. Goods Schedules: Members’ Commitments, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_e.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2018).
29. See Pauwelyn et al., supra note 22, at 182.  Although the WTO aims for increased
trade liberalization, the WTO does not prohibit tariffs. Tariffs, in the simplest sense, are fees
that a company pays to export its goods abroad and gain access to a specific foreign country’s
market. See id.  Tariffs are imposed on merchandise imports and give a price advantage to
locally-produced goods over similar goods that are imported. Tariffs, WTO, https://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tariffs_e/tariffs_e.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2017). Tariffs also
help raise revenue for the government. Id.
30. Goods Schedule: Members’ Commitments, supra note 28.
31. Member Information: The European Union and the WTO, WTO, https://www.wto.
org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2018).
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the UK has also been a WTO Member since January 1, 1995 in accordance
with Article XI:132 of the WTO Agreement.33
Although the UK lacks full autonomy in the WTO, its rights and obli-
gations as a WTO Member State are still the same as those of any other
WTO Member.  This understanding was reinforced in EC/Certain-MS
Airbus.  In EC/Certain-MS Airbus, the WTO Panel34 rejected the EU’s re-
quest to remove five Member States, including the UK, as respondents and
to leave the EU as the sole respondent.35  In rejecting the EU’s request, the
Panel stated that “[e]ach of these five [Member States] is, in its own right, a
Member of the WTO, with all the rights and obligations pertaining to such
membership, including the obligation to respond to claims made against it
by another WTO Member.”36  The UK’s unique position as a WTO Mem-
ber and as a Member State represented by the European Union thus com-
plicates the WTO’s efforts to disentangle the UK from the EU both
substantively and administratively.
32. Article XI:1 of the WTO Agreement states:
The contracting parties to GATT 1947 as of the date of entry into force of this
Agreement, and the European Communities, which accept this Agreement and the
Multilateral Trade Agreements and for which Schedules of Concessions and Com-
mitments are annexed to GATT 1994 and for which Schedules of Specific Com-
mitments are annexed to GATS shall become original Members of the WTO.
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. XI:1, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. In short, Article XI:1 simply allows
those who were members of the GATT to automatically become members to the WTO.
33. Member Information: The European Union and the WTO, supra note 31; see also Bar-
tels, supra note 19, at 3.
34. WTO panels are quasi-judicial bodies that are the first to hear and adjudicate trade
disputes between WTO Members.  A WTO panel is normally comprised of three experts
selected on an ad hoc basis.  The Panel must review the factual and legal components of the
case it is reviewing and submit a report to the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”), the WTO
branch in charge of dispute settlements, that expresses the Panel’s conclusions and recom-
mendation for implementation by the respondent. WTO Bodies Involved in the Dispute Settle-
ment, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c3s3p1_e
.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2017). The WTO also has an Appellate Body, which is a standing
body of seven people.  A WTO Member can appeal the report it received from the Panel
regarding its dispute, and the Appellate Body can “uphold, modify, or reverse the legal find-
ings and conclusions of a panel.”  The Appellate Body also issues a report after hearing a
specific dispute, and the report must be accepted by the disputed parties once the DSB
adopts the Appellate Body Report. Dispute Settlement: Appellate Body, WTO, https://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2017).
35. Panel Report, European Communities and Certain Member States: Measures Affecting
Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WTO Doc. WT/DS316/R (adopted June 1, 2001).
36. Id. at 321.
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III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF BREXIT AND THE WTO:
THE CONCERNS
The UK’s access to the EU’s single market is one of the most beneficial
features of EU membership. Goods, people, services, and capital circulate
freely among Member States.37  After Brexit, however, the UK will no
longer have immediate access to the EU’s single market and must negotiate
all its trade relationships.38  Currently, the UK has preferential trade agree-
ments with the EU and with fifty-eight countries as an EU member state.39
Leaving the EU will naturally force the UK to renegotiate these prior trade
agreements.40  The UK will also likely encounter tariff and non-tariff barri-
ers in accessing the EU market, and the increase in cost for the UK to trade
with the same markets will damage the competitiveness of UK companies.
WTO Director-General Roberto Azeˆvedo predicts that UK exporters may
have to pay up to £5.6 billion each year in duty on their exports,41 and the
services trade42 will also be significantly affected.43
Moreover, certain rights will no longer apply to the UK, and the UK
may need to renegotiate with other WTO Members to maintain these
rights.  The EU’s guarantees of free movement of people and of protecting
public utilities from competition may no longer be safeguarded in the UK.44
37. What is the Common Customs Tariff?, EUR. COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/taxa
tion_customs/business/calculation-customs-duties/what-is-common-customs-tariff_en (last
visited Nov. 21, 2017).
38. See, e.g., Shehab Khan, Britain Will Not Have Same Access to Single Market After
Brexit, Top Tory in Brussels Admits, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 5, 2017, 5:02 PM), http://www.inde
pendent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/europe-not-allow-britain-better-position-brexit-leader-con
servative-party-at-european-parliament-a7833906.html.
39. Roberto Azeˆvedo, WTO, Azˆevedo Addresses World Trade Symposium in London on the
State of Global Trade (June 7, 2016), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spra_e/spra126_
e.htm.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. This Note defines “services trade” as analogous to services covered in the WTO’s
General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”).  Although this Note only focuses on
trade in goods, it is worth noting that the UK’s renegotiations in the WTO will also include
its trade in services encompassed within the GATS.  The GATS is “the only set of multilat-
eral rules covering international trade in services” and “reflects the gradual transfer of re-
sponsibility for many services from government-owned suppliers to the private sector and
the increased potential for trade in services brought about by advances in information and
communication technology.” The GATS categorizes trade in services into four modes, and
services that fall within the GATS include business and professional services such as legal
and computer services, tourism services, educational services, environmental services, and
financial services. Trade in Services, WTO, 1, 3-4, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
20y_e/services_brochure2015_e.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2017).
43. Id.
44. Id.
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Losing the right of free movement is especially troublesome because the
UK is the world’s third largest exporter of services.45  The UK attracts sig-
nificant overseas investment from major foreign firms that hope to use the
UK, particularly London, as a base to enter the European markets.46  If the
UK can no longer guarantee the free movement of people from London to
other major European cities, these firms may be incentivized to move their
European headquarters from London to another European city, such as Mi-
lan or Paris, where free movement is ensured.47  Thus, while many British
citizens supported Brexit partially because of angst over increased immigra-
tion resulting from free movement policies, many may have failed to ac-
count for the free movement’s corresponding economic and business
benefits.
Brexit will also have trade implications outside of the UK’s relationship
with the EU.  For instance, as Director-General Azeˆvedo claims, the UK
will need to “re-establish its terms of trade within the WTO.”48  There are
several challenges behind this endeavor, primarily that the UK does not
have defined terms in the WTO for its trade in goods and services.  Direc-
tor-General Azeˆvedo has warned that “it would be impossible for the UK to
‘cut and paste’ its old EU deals into new agreements,” although Director-
General Azeˆvedo has failed to explain precisely why the UK could not fol-
low a “cut and paste” method.49  Instead, Director-General Azeˆvedo has
warned that the UK would be “starting from scratch without the institu-
tional machinery necessary to negotiate trade deals.”50
If the UK needs to start negotiations from the very beginning, the
country will most likely forfeit its previous advantageous position of being
part of the larger EU market.  Moreover, it is doubtful that the UK can get
as favorable of an agreement with other countries as when the UK was an
EU Member.  For example, the UK will most likely not benefit from the
free trade agreements the EU has negotiated with Korea, Chile, Mexico,
45. Beattie, supra note 4.
46. See SWATI DHINGRA ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. PERFORMANCE, THE IMPACT OF BREXIT ON
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UK 2 (Apr. 2016), http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit03.
pdf (listing reasons why foreign direct investment might fall if the UK left the EU).
47. ANDREW LANG, LSE LAW, THE CONSEQUENCES OF BREXIT: SOME COMPLICATIONS FROM
INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (June 2014), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/64046/1/Policy%20briefing%203_
2014.pdf.
48. Azeˆvedo, supra note 39.
49. Larry Elliot, WTO Chief Says Post-Brexit Talks Must Start from Scratch, GUARDIAN,
June 7, 2016, 7:37 AM, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jun/07/wto-chief-brexit-
trade-talks-start-scratch-eu-referendum.
50. Id.
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and South Africa.51  In short, the UK’s bargaining power may suffer from its
inability to freely access the EU and its market.
Even if the UK can “cut and paste” the UK’s old EU deals into new
agreements, most of the EU’s current commitments in the WTO are un-
known.  The only confirmed commitments on tariffs, quotas, and farm sub-
sidies are from before 2004, when the EU only had 15 Member States.52
While the EU has expanded three times since 2004, it has yet to agree with
the WTO membership on revised commitments.53  For instance, the EU
limited its spending on agricultural subsidies to C= 6.72 billion in its pre-
2004 commitment.  However, the EU reported a limit of C= 72.4 billion to
the WTO on its subsidies, potentially from a draft that has yet to be agreed
to by the WTO’s membership.54  The UK will therefore be negotiating a
share of key quantities that are unknown or have yet to be agreed to by the
WTO membership.55
Lastly, the sheer amount of work and time the UK will expend to re-
negotiate its terms of trade in the WTO will also be challenging.  The EU
(and UK) has approximately 20,000 products listed for collecting customs
duties, thousands of product standards regulations, and extremely compli-
cated limits on access to its services market.56  Since the WTO operates by
consensus, only one country needs to object to stall negotiations.  Consider-
ing negotiations involving only an adjustment of Members’ existing terms
in their Schedule takes years to complete, it is impossible to estimate how
long it may take for the UK to finalize its own Schedule.57
In addition to the significant time delay, Maika Oshikawa, Counsellor
of the WTO’s Accessions Division, has indicated that the UK will likely
need to garner political consensus for its new Schedule of Concessions
among the 163-plus WTO Members.58  The prospect of successfully con-
ducting negotiations with this many WTO Members is dim, especially
given that recent negotiations have revealed WTO Members’ unwillingness
to accommodate each other’s trade interests.59  Reaching a final agreement
will be tedious and not guaranteed.
How and what the UK can do to establish itself as an independent
Member is thus a crucial question that must be resolved.  The most
51. LANG, supra note 47, at 2.
52. Ungphakorn, supra note 19.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Azeˆvedo, supra note 39.
58. Mucci, supra note 17.
59. Ungphakorn, supra note 19.
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straightforward process, disregarding Director-General Azeˆvedo’s previous
statements, is for the UK to copy the EU’s Schedule of Concessions. But
even this process contains challenges.
First, because decision-making within the WTO operates on consensus,
any WTO Member that objects to the UK’s Schedule of Concessions would
prevent the UK’s Schedule from being approved.  For the reasons noted
above, an objection is a nearly certain likelihood.
Secondly, not every sector can be exactly adopted.  While the UK likely
can adopt the import tariffs set by the EU for industrial goods, such as
shoes and clothing, agriculture poses a more difficult problem given the
political sensitivity and logistical complications surrounding that sector.60
In addition to straightforward tariffs, each country’s agricultural WTO
commitment contains “tariff-rate quotas,” which allow a certain amount of
produce to enter at lower duties.61  Since quotas are divided and allotted to
exporters by country, the EU and UK will not only have to conduct their
own negotiations to redistribute the quota, but the UK will also have to
negotiate with the other WTO Members to establish the UK’s quota with
each country.62
For the UK’s services sector, Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, Director of the
European Centre for International Political Economy and a former EU
Trade Negotiator, believes that while theoretically it will not be difficult to
create a services schedule for the UK out of the EU’s Schedule, it will be an
“excruciating legal process.”63  Time will be a significant detriment to the
UK, especially given the substantially larger role the services sector plays in
the UK’s economy.64  For instance, the EU services schedule did not incor-
porate Bulgaria and Romania until five years after they joined the EU.65  If
the UK were to act on a similar timeline, its services sector could be se-
verely disrupted.  As previously mentioned, the UK has been attractive be-
cause of its connection to the free movement and people of the EU.  Losing
this component may deter further foreign investment.
There is also a question of how the services sector would operate within
the international trade regime without a concrete schedule of services.  Such
turbulence could lead the country to a potential economic recession.
The UK’s decision to leave the EU poses challenges with significant
consequences that will affect the UK’s relationship with the EU and the
60. Beattie, supra note 4.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id. (stating that the UK is the world’s third-largest exporter of services).
65. Id.
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WTO.  Despite speculations and predictions about the sheer amount of ne-
gotiations the UK must engage in following its official secession from the
EU, the UK and the WTO face the most important question that remains:
exactly what sort of accession will the WTO require from the UK to exer-
cise its full status as a WTO Member.
IV. WHAT UK’S ACCESSION TO THE WTO MAY LOOK LIKE
The following proposals are three possible administrative proceedings
the WTO can use to address the UK’s missing Schedule of Concessions and
its unique position in the international organization.  Each proposal
presents its own administrative challenges, and none of these proposals of-
fers a perfect solution.  Moreover, the complexity and challenges within
these three proposals reflect the complexities of global administrative law
overall, and the challenges international organizations, such as the WTO,
face when dealing in a space that involves domestic and international
players.
The third proposal—de facto application of Article XXVI:5(c) and tariff
modifications under Article XXVIII of the GATT 1947—may be the most
ideal and realistic proposal.  This proposal addresses the WTO’s adminis-
trative challenges in dealing with this unprecedented situation and provides
the UK with the necessary flexibility to create and adopt its own trade
policy distinct from the EU’s trade policy.
A. Proposal #1: Adopting a Schedule of Concessions under
Article XXVI:5(c) of the GATT 1947
Although there has been much discussion about the implications of
Brexit and the challenges behind the UK’s ability to re-establish its terms of
trade in the WTO, there has been minimal discussion as to the exact proce-
dure the UK must undergo to rectify and modify its Schedule of Conces-
sions.  Lorand Bartels, law professor at the University of Cambridge, offers
one proposal for the UK’s unprecedented situation: to allow the UK to cre-
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ate its Schedule of Concessions, the WTO should proceed in accordance to
Article XXVI:5(c)66 of the GATT 1947.67
Article XXVI:5(c) permits newly autonomous customs territories,
which historically have been former colonial territories, to succeed to
GATT contracting party status upon the request and sponsorship of the
formerly responsible GATT contracting party.68  Following succession, the
newly independent territory inherits all the rights and obligations previ-
ously in place when the territory was still a colony, including the Schedule
of Concessions of its former governing State.69  Submitting new GATT
1947 Schedules in this context is recognized as other “changes,” except when
the Schedule requires an increase in duties beyond the bound tariff rate.70
To implement Article XXVI:5(c), the UK’s Schedule of Concessions
would be annexed to the GATT 1994 and the GATS.  The 1980 Decision
on Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedule of Tariff
Concessions (the “1980 Decision”) is binding as part of the GATT 1994 and
governs the current procedure for making changes to GATT 1994 and the
GATS.71  The 1980 Decision is particularly relevant to Article XXVI:5(c)
because of paragraph five of the 1980 Decision, which explicitly states that
“the procedure of Certification under this Decision may be applied for the
establishment of consolidated Schedules or of new Schedules under para-
graph 5(c) of Article XXVI, wherein all changes are modifications or rectifi-
cations referred to in paragraphs 1 or 2.”72
The fact that the 1980 Decision distinguishes between “changes” and
“modifications” is significant.  Paragraph one of the 1980 Decision explains
that “modifications” must be certified by means of Certification.  Con-
versely, paragraph two of the 1980 Decision explains that “changes” are
66. Article XXVI:5(c), entitled “Acceptance, Entry into Force and Registration,” reads:
(c) If any of the customs territories, in respect of which a contracting party has
accepted this Agreement, possesses or acquires full autonomy in the conduct of its
external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this Agree-
ment, such territory shall, upon sponsorship through a declaration by the responsi-
ble contracting party establishing the above-mentioned fact, be deemed to be a
contracting party.
WTO, Article XXVI – Acceptance, Entry into Force and Registration, in 2 ANALYTICAL INDEX:
GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 908 (Bernan eds., 6th ed. 1995) [hereinafter ANALYTICAL
INDEX GATT VOL. 2].
67. See generally Bartels, supra note 19.
68. Id. at 16.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 13.
72. Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules of Tariff Concessions, GATT
Doc. L/4962 ¶ 4 (Mar. 28, 1980) [hereinafter the 1980 Decision].
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more of a formality and shall be made by means of Certification, not certi-
fied by means of Certification as detailed in paragraph one.73
From Bartels’ perspective, “modifications” under paragraph one are con-
cerned with modifications that negatively affect concessions while “changes”
under paragraph two are simply neutral changes that do not alter the scope
of the Schedule of Concessions.74  Whether an alteration is considered a
“modification” or a “change” affects the procedural nature of the alteration.
Objections to “modifications” reflected in paragraph one lead to arbitration
to determine appropriate compensation whereas objections to “changes” re-
flected in paragraph two only initially lead to revised versions of non-alter-
ing modifications.75  The fact that the 1980 Decision recognizes the
adoption of a new GATT 1947 Schedule of Concessions under Article
XXVI:5(c) thus simplifies the accession process for newly independent ter-
ritories and limits the ability for current WTO Members to object to the
State’s Schedule of Concessions and its accession to the WTO.
Bartels advocates for the WTO to follow a similar procedure, arguing
that while Article XXVI:5(c) is no longer operative,76 the WTO could still
refer to this specific provision as a guiding source in annexing the UK’s
Schedule of Concessions.77  Bartels suggests that the UK’s departure from
the EU parallels the circumstances of those territories that traditionally fell
under Article XXVI:5(c).78  Both cases concern the acquisition by a customs
territory of full autonomy in matters covered by the GATT 1947 or WTO,
and both need to adopt a Schedule of Concessions.79 Using Article
XXVI:5(c) as guidance, Bartels suggests that the UK should submit new
Schedules under Article II of the GATT 1994 and Article XX of the GATS
as “other changes” and rectifications to the current EU Schedule with re-
spect to itself and its territory.80  If the WTO were to accept the UK’s
Schedule of Concessions submission as a “change,” other WTO Members
would have limited grounds for objection.81  This would thereby provide the
UK with an avenue that could potentially speed up its quasi-accession pro-
cess and minimize the economic damage the UK may suffer while unpro-
tected from rising tariff and non-tariff barriers.
73. Id.
74. See Bartels, supra note 19, at 13-14.
75. Id. at 14.
76. Despite this suggestion, Bartels offers no support to explain why Article XXVI:5(c)
is no longer operative.
77. Bartels, supra note 19, at 17.
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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Although Bartels’ proposal is appealing, it is vulnerable to criticism.
First, the likelihood of the WTO adopting this interpretation is debatable,
and Director-General Azeˆvedo’s warning about the UK’s inability to “cut
and paste” the EU’s Schedule suggests hostility to Bartels’ plan. Moreover,
as previously explained, the UK must disentangle itself from the EU’s tariff
Schedule and quota restrictions.  This disentanglement would count as a
modification to both the UK and EU’s Schedule because the scope of the
UK and EU’s Schedules of Concessions will be altered.  The UK will need
to independently adopt its own Schedule and since the EU’s tariff schedule
and quota restrictions include the UK, the EU will need to adjust its Sched-
ule (e.g. reduce its quota restrictions) to account for the UK no longer being
an EU Member-State.  This action would trigger Article XXVIII of GATT
1947, which requires new agreements and negotiations with other WTO
Members.82
The biggest weakness in Bartels’ argument is Article XXVI:5(c) itself.
Even if the WTO could procedurally allow the UK to adopt a Schedule of
Concessions through a process similar to Article XXVI:5(c), Bartels’ argu-
ment rests on a shaky assumption that the UK will want to permanently
adopt the EU’s Schedule in its exact form.83  Yet, the UK has hinted at its
desire to become a free-trade country.84  This preference for increased trade
liberalization undermines the idea that the UK would adopt the EU’s
Schedule of Concessions, making it difficult to for the UK to encourage the
WTO to follow Bartels’ proposal.85
82. LANG, supra note 47, at 3.
83. The fact that the UK would have to adopt the same Schedule of Concessions as the
EU is further supported by the report of the Working Party on “Article XXXV – Application
to Japan,” which pointed out “that there could be no doubt that a government becoming a
contracting party under Article XXVI:5(c) does so on the terms and conditions previously
accepted by the metropolitan government on behalf of the territory in question.” ANALYTICAL
INDEX GATT VOL. 2, supra note 66, at 921.
84. See Liam Fox, Speech Delivered by International Trade Secretary Liam Fox at the
Manchester Town Hall (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/liam-foxs-
free-trade-speech (speaking how “free and fair trade is fundamental to the prosperity of the
United Kingdom and the world economy”); see also Liam Fox, International Trade Secretary’s
Speech at the AEI During His U.S. Visit for the First Meeting of the UK-US Trade and Investment
Working Group (July 24, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/liam-fox-champi
ons-global-free-trade (speaking generally to the fact that “if nations are allowed to engage in
free and open trade . . . then there is a mutual increase in economic welfare between nations,
making those countries richer as a result.”).
85. See Fox, Speech Delivered by International Trade Secretary Liam Fox at the Manchester
Town Hall, supra note 84; see also Rowena Mason, Liam Fox Looks to WTO in Hint at ‘Hard
Brexit’ Stance, GUARDIAN (Sept. 29, 2016, 8:17 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/
2016/sep/29/liam-fox-looks-to-wto-in-hint-at-hard-brexit-stance.
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Of course, the UK could adopt the EU’s Schedule while maintaining its
stance on free-trade. Since a Schedule of Concessions focuses only on the
bound tariff rate, the UK could impose a nominal tariff rate on its goods, or
even no tariff rate at all to reflect its policy of free-trade.  One would be
hard-pressed to find countries who would be opposed to more liberalized
trade borders, and such a tactic would still preserve the appeal behind Bar-
tels’ proposal of allowing the UK to undergo an accession process modeled
after Article XXVI:5(c).
Even this strategy, however, contains weaknesses that may undermine
Bartels’ plan.  As previously noted, the EU’s commitments to the WTO are
still murky.  The UK would first have to undergo a series of negotiations
with the EU and a WTO working group to first determine (1) what are the
EU’s specific commitments and (2) how much the EU’s agricultural subsi-
dies and tariff quotas will need to be reduced in its Schedule to account for
the EU’s smaller footprint without the UK.  This procedure could take
months, if not years, and this delay undermines Bartels’s argument that the
Article XXVI:5(c) process is an expedited and simplified method for the
UK to adopt its Schedule of Concessions.
Despite Bartels’ claim, the UK’s unique situation also may not be analo-
gous to those cases that fell under Article XXVI:5(c) for three reasons.
First, unlike the countries that invoked the accession process under Article
XXVI:5(c), the UK is not a former colony.  This legal status is a crucial
difference. British laws are independent from EU laws, and because certain
legislation intertwines EU and British law, the accession process is not as
clean as Bartels suggests.86  Second, Article XXVI:5(c)’s purpose was to
establish a right of succession to contracting party status.87  The UK’s status
as a full WTO Member undermines the country’s legitimate use of a proce-
dure for former colonies.
Lastly, the UK’s political climate may reject a proposal in which the UK
permanently adopts the EU’s Schedule of Concessions.  Following the out-
come of the June referendum, one could assume that British citizens want to
disassociate from the EU. Adopting the EU’s Schedule of Concessions may
stir backlash.  Indeed, as suggested by one newspaper, adopting the EU’s
Schedule of Concessions “makes a mockery of everything Brexit stands
for.”88
86. Ian Dunt, Twenty Reasons Why Brexit Will Be Even Trickier Than We Thought, GUARD-
IAN (Dec. 6, 2016, 11:19 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/dec/06/twenty-rea
sons-brexit-trickier-than-we-thought.
87. Bartels, supra note 19, at 17.
88. Dunt, supra note 86.
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B. Proposal #2: De Facto Application of GATT Article
XXVI:5(c) and Accession under GATT Article XXXIII
One alternative to Bartels’ proposal is de facto application of GATT
Article XXVI:5(c) and accession under GATT Article XXXIII (“Acces-
sion”).89 The purpose of de facto application of Article XXVI:5(c) is “to
provide some time for governments of newly-independent territories to
consider their future commercial policy and the question of their relations
with the General Agreement, while continuing the pre-existing arrange-
ments governing the trade relations between the newly-independent coun-
try and the contracting parties to the GATT.”90  Administratively, the
Recommendation of November 1, 1957 on “Procedures for Sponsorship
under Article XXVI:5(c)” states that the responsible contracting party
should notify the Secretariat of the WTO when the newly autonomous ter-
ritory becomes fully independent in its external commercial relations.91
The Contracting Parties will then set a “reasonable time” period under
which the territory in question will continue with de facto application of
Article XXVI:5(c).92
Countries such as Cambodia used this procedure despite their eligibil-
ity under Article XXVI:5(c) because Cambodia did not want to accept the
terms and conditions of their previous governments, including any applica-
ble Schedule of Concessions.93  Cambodia requested accession under Article
XXXIII, not Article XXVI:5(c), to avoid assuming the former Schedule of
Concessions of France for Indo-China, believing that doing so was in their
best interest.94  According to the Royal Government of Cambodia, Cambo-
dia’s trade represented only part of the Indo-Chinese trade, and “the Sched-
89. In full, Article XXXIII, “Accession,” states:
A government not party to this Agreement, or a government acting on behalf of a
separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external
commercial relations and other matters provided for in this Agreement, may ac-
cede to this Agreement, on its own behalf or on behalf of that territory, on terms
to be agreed between such government and the CONTRACTING PARTIES. Decisions of
the CONTRACTING PARTIES under this paragraph shall be taken by a two-thirds
majority.
ANALYTICAL INDEX GATT VOL. 2, supra note 66, at 1017.
90. Id. at 921.
91. Id. (citing Recommendation of Nov. 1, 1957 on Procedures for Sponsorship under
Article XXVI:5(c)).
92. Id. at 921-22 (noting, however, that the Recommendation of Nov. 11, 1967 on “Ap-
plication of the General Agreement to Territories which acquire Autonomy in Commercial
Matters” agreement never set forth a specific time period to be considered “reasonable.”).
93. See id. at 1025.
94. See id. at 1025 n.45.
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ules which have been negotiated on the basis of such trade represent at
present a very heavy burden.”95
Similarly, the UK can adopt this procedure given its eligibility under
the second half of Article XXXIII as “a government acting on behalf of a
separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its
external commercial relations and other matter provided for in this Agree-
ment,” who thus “may accede to this Agreement, on its behalf of behalf of
that territory, on terms to be agreed between such government and the
CONTRACTING PARTIES.”96
It should be noted that Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement97 (“Ac-
cession”) governs current accession procedures to the WTO. While Article
XII’s language differs from Article XXXIII’s language, the overall concept
behind both accession provisions are consistent, and the UK would be eligi-
ble for succession under Article XII:1.98  Thus, once the UK invokes de facto
application of Article XXVI:5(c), the UK would begin its accession under
Article XII.
Accession under Article XII presumably follows a similar protocol to
Article XXXIII.99  The UK will notify the Secretariat of the country’s de-
sire to negotiate with other Members to enter the Marrakesh Agreement
and provide written answers to all of the WTO Members’ questions.100
The UK will then negotiate its Schedule of Concessions with other Mem-
bers who wish to participate.101  Once tariff negotiations conclude, the
Schedule will be annexed to the draft Protocol of Accessions and submitted
to the General Council for adoption of the report of the accession working
party and approval of the Protocol of Accession.  Following this step, the
Ministerial Conference will then conduct a vote to approve the accession,
which requires a two-thirds majority vote from the WTO Members.102
95. Accession of Cambodia: Statement by the Representative of the Royal Government of Cam-
bodia at a Meeting of the CONTRACTING PARTIES on 30 October 1958, GATT Doc. L/900 1
(Nov. 1, 1958), https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90720012.pdf.
96. ANALYTICAL INDEX GATT VOL. 2, supra note 66, at 1017.
97. The Marrakesh Agreement established the WTO.  Marrakesh Agreement, supra
note 32, at 155.
98. The relevant provision of Article XII:1 states: “Any State or separate customs terri-
tory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of
other matters provided for in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may
accede to this Agreement, on terms to be agreed between it and the WTO.” Id. art. XII:1.
99. Article XII does not seem to have explanatory notes like the GATT.
100. See generally ANALYTICAL INDEX GATT VOL. 2, supra note 66, at 1019.
101. Id. (“Accession tariff negotiations are held between the acceding government and
those contracting parties to the GATT which wish to participate therein, in parallel with the
working party.”).
102. ANALYTICAL INDEX GATT VOL. 2, supra note 66, at 1019; see also Marrakesh Agree-
ment, supra note 32, art. XII:2.
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There are, of course, challenges to this specific procedure.  As with all
the proposals this paper introduces, time will be an issue.  One must assume
that the WTO will not allow for a de facto application of Article XXVI:5(c)
until the UK triggers Article 50 of Lisbon Treaty to secede from the EU, or
even until the UK has officially and completely seceded from the EU.
Prime Minister May has announced that she will trigger Article 50 in
March of 2017,103 which gives the UK two years to negotiate its withdrawal.
Thus, the WTO may allow for a de facto application of Article XXVI:5(c) as
early as March of 2017 or as late as March of 2019.104  If the WTO does not
allow for de facto application until March 2019, whether the UK is able to
continue to trade under the EU’s Schedule of Concessions is subject to
debate, and perhaps contingent on secession negotiations between the UK
and EU under Article 50.  Once Article XXVI:5(c) is de facto applied, acces-
sion tariff negotiations under Article XII will likely take at least several
months.  The bureaucracy behind drafting the necessary documents may
significantly slow down the accession process.  How quickly negotiations
will be conducted will depend on how many WTO Members choose to ask
questions and participate in the negotiations, and how willing these coun-
tries will be to compromise with the UK in its tariff negotiations.  Since the
UK is a powerful and wealthy country, many will most likely choose to
participate.  The UK thus faces the daunting tasks of securing the support
of approximately 109 countries to reach the necessary two-third’s majority
vote.105
Additionally, the WTO Members, including the EU, may oppose a de
facto application of Article XXVI:5(c).  While the Members have never de-
fined the meaning of de facto application, previous practices suggest that a
de facto application will give the UK broad discretion over what the country
does not have to do.106  For instance, the UK will neither have to notify any
103. Theresa May: Brexit Plans to Be Laid out in New Year, BBC NEWS (Dec. 20, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-38383216.
104. See Caroline Mortimer, Brexit: What is Article 50 and How Long Will It Take for
Britain to Leave the EU?, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 2, 2016, 5:11 PM), http://www.independent.
co.uk/news/uk/politics/article-50-what-is-brexit-how-long-britain-leave-eu-referendum-the-
resa-may-latest-a7341691.html (Theresa May triggered Article 50 in March 2017. From
March 2017, the UK has “exactly two years to negotiate a new settlement before it has to
leave [the EU].”). See also, Hunt & Wheeler, supra note 14.
105. There are 164 WTO Members as of July 29, 2016.  To reach the two-third’s major-
ity vote, the UK will need to secure the support of approximately 109 WTO Members. See
generally Members and Observers, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/
tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2017). See also Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 32,
Art. XII:2.
106. ANALYTICAL INDEX GATT VOL. 2, supra note 66, at 923. (Noting that although the
“Contracting Parties have never defined the meaning of de facto application,” there were
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modifications of their tariff Schedules under Article XXVIII nor notify the
GATT, or consult the GATT Balance-of-Payments Committee under Arti-
cle XVIII:B if the UK imposes import restrictions for balance of payment
purposes.107  Given the UK’s economic and political status, one may reason-
ably presume that WTO Members will greatly resist these flexible provi-
sions for the UK.
What further complicates this proposal is the UK already being a WTO
Member.  To have the WTO invoke Article XII as a means for the UK to
negotiate and adopt its own tariff Schedule may be seen as an illegitimate
workaround to the provisions.
Nevertheless, this proposal may still be a realistic possibility that the
WTO may consider when dealing with this novel issue.  The UK’s status as
a powerful and wealthy nation still provides the country with some bargain-
ing power, and smaller countries in the WTO may depend on the UK for
certain goods.  Moreover, the EU may also have to re-negotiate its own
Schedule of Concessions because the UK’s secession will affect the propor-
tion of its tariff quotas and the like.  Should the EU also have to enter
negotiations, the UK will have leverage in the form of threatened objections
over the EU to garner favorable terms for its own Schedule.  If the UK can
obtain a notable level of bargaining power, following this procedure will
allow the UK to mitigate potential and serious adverse trade effects Brexit
may impose on the British economy and the UK’s trading partners. Adher-
ing to the procedure may also provide some flexibility for the country to
formulate its own trade agenda.
C. Proposal #3: De Facto Application of Article XXVI:5(c) and
Tariff Modifications under Article XXVIII of the
GATT 1947
The third, and perhaps most realistic proposal, is to still apply a de facto
application of Article XXVI:5(c).  However, instead of the UK adopting its
Schedule of Concessions under an Article XII accession process, the UK
could adopt its Schedule Concessions as a tariff modification under Article
XXVIII of the GATT 1947 (“Modification of Schedules”), specifically Arti-
cle XXVIII:5.108  Article XXVIII:5 allows a country to “reserve the right,
certain practices that had evolved “in regard to this form of association with the General
Agreement.”).
107. Id.
108. Article XXVIII:5 states:
“Before 1 January 1958 and before the end of any period envisaged in paragraph 1 a
contracting party may elect by notifying the CONTRACTING PARTIES to re-
serve the right, for the duration of the next period, to modify the appropriate
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for the duration of the next period, to modify the appropriate Schedule in
accordance with the procedures of paragraph 1 to 3” of Article XXVIII with
each duration lasting for a three-year period.109  Through this approach, the
UK can assume the EU’s Schedule of Concessions under Article XXVI:5(c)
while also invoking Article XXVIII:5 to allow the country to change certain
parts of the Schedule of Concessions.  Only those changed provisions would
undergo modification and tariff renegotiations.  As with the second propo-
sal, following this approach may maintain trade stability while providing the
UK flexibility in setting its own trade agenda.
This model has been used by previous countries acceding to the WTO,
most notably, Bangladesh.  Following its independence from Pakistan, Ban-
gladesh requested accession to GATT under Article XXXIII in 1972.110  Ac-
cording to several Contracting Parties, however, the normal procedure
under Article XXXIII, which included the creation of a working party and
full negotiations with the Contracting Parties to create a new Schedule,
seemed inappropriate in Bangladesh’s situation.111  Bangladesh continued to
apply the GATT in its trade relationships and was prepared to take over all
of Pakistan’s obligations—including Pakistan’s tariff concessions—so long as
Bangladesh could reserve its right under Article XXVIII:5 to modify its
Schedule of Concessions for the next three years following its accession to
the GATT and the WTO.112  Indeed, Bangladesh itself believed that the
current provisions of the General Agreement did not adequately address its
unique situation.113  As a result of Bangladesh’s situation, particularly Ban-
gladesh’s willingness to adopt Pakistan’s Schedule of Concessions subject to
the ability to invoke Article XXVIII:5, a number of Contracting Parties
modified the usual procedure of Article XXXIII, believing that “as the cir-
Schedule in accordance with the procedures of paragraph 1 to 3.  If a contracting
party so elects, other contracting parties shall have the right, during the same
period, to modify or withdraw, in accordance with the same procedures, conces-
sions initially negotiated with that contracting party.”
ANALYTICAL INDEX GATT VOL. 2, supra note 66, at 935.
109. Id. at 935.
110. See id.
111. Id. (“In Council discussion, a number of contracting parties considered that given
the undertaking of Bangladesh to accept the full obligations of a schedule of tariff bindings
identical with that applied before independence. . . it [was not] necessary to set up the usual
working party to consider and report on the sustainability of Bangladesh membership.”).
112. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT], Accession of the People’s Republic
of Bangladesh, Nov. 13, 1972, GATT Doc. L/3771, [hereinafter Accession of Bangladesh]; see also
GATT, Invocation of Paragraph 5 of Article XXVIII, Jan. 4, 1973, WTO Doc. L/3804, https://
www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90880011.pdf.
113. Accession of Bangladesh, supra note 112, at 3.
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cumstances in this case were unusual[,] the CONTRACTING PARTIES
should be ready to modify the usual procedures in dealing with it.”114
Bangladesh’s unusual situation is perhaps most analogous to the UK’s
situation today.115  The UK will presumably follow GATT and WTO pro-
cedures following its secession from the EU and can adopt the EU’s Sched-
ule if the UK can invoke Article XXVIII:5.  The UK may also be able to
expedite this process, as it is already a WTO Member, by simply beginning
tariff negotiations under Article XXVIII:1116 when Article XXVI:5(c) is de
facto applied.  Under Article XXVIII, the UK will enter bilateral negotia-
tions with WTO Members who have a “principal or substantial supplying
interest in a concession which is to be subject of negotiation and consulta-
tion under Article XXVIII.”117  Presuming that not every WTO Member
will have a “principal or substantial supplying interest” in the specific con-
cession, the UK may not have to negotiate with as many countries or obtain
two-thirds majority approval in order for that specific line provision to be
approved.118
The challenges to adopting this procedure are similar to the challenges
presented in the second proposal, specifically in relation to Article
XXVI:5(c).  Negotiations will certainly be difficult and tedious, and the EU
could make the negotiating process particularly troublesome due to linger-
114. ANALYTICAL INDEX GATT VOL. 2, supra note 66, at 1025; see also Application Received
from the Government of Bangladesh, WTO Doc. L/3752 (Oct. 13, 1972) (Communication
from Bangladesh seeking accession under Article XXXIII); Summary of the Sixth Meeting,
WTO Doc. SR.28/6 81-85 (Nov. 13, 1972).
115. Although academic sources have hinted that Bangladesh was an unusual case, there
is limited information explaining why the country was an unusual WTO case.
116. Article XXVIII:1 of the GATT 1947 reads:
“On the first day of each three-year period, the first period beginning on 1 January
1958 (or on the first day of any other period* that may be specified by the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES by two-thirds of the votes cast) a contracting party (here-
after in this Article referred to as the ‘applicant contracting party’) may, by
negotiation and agreement with any contracting party with which such concession
was initially negotiated and with any other contracting party determined by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES to have a principal supplying interest* (which two
preceding categories of contracting parties, together with the applicant contracting
party, are in this Article hereinafter referred to as the ‘contracting parties prima-
rily concerned’), and subject to consultation with any other contracting party de-
termined by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to have a substantial interest* in
such concessions, modify or withdraw a concession* included in the appropriate
Schedule annexed to this Agreement.”
ANALYTICAL INDEX GATT VOL. 2, supra note 66, at 960.
The Interpretative Note for Article XXVIII from Annex I has been omitted but may be
found in ANALYTICAL INDEX GATT VOL. 2, supra note 66, Article XXVIII.
117. ANALYTICAL INDEX GATT VOL. 2, supra note 66, at 960.
118. Id. at 935.
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ing frustration from Brexit.  There is also a possibility that, once negotia-
tions commence under Article XXVI, the window for negotiation may
trigger an avalanche that subjects everything to negotiation, a dangerous
possibility even if Member countries extend a good faith limitation in their
negotiations.
Despite these challenges, this model has strong merits.  This procedure
may be more complex than Bartels’ proposal, but the benefits of this proce-
dure’s flexibility may outweigh the costs of additional negotiation steps.
Agreeing to adopt the EU’s Schedule of Concessions with the reservation of
Article XXVIII is a suitable compromise to balance the need for trade sta-
bility with the need to give the UK flexibility to determine its trade policy.
The fact that the UK will formally be undergoing tariff modifications, and
not accession as the two other proposals suggest, may significantly
strengthen the legitimacy and plausibility of this model.  One must bear in
mind that the UK’s situation is unique, and perhaps the WTO’s best strat-
egy is to emulate a previous situation most like the problem today to help
legitimize the process:  here, following Bangladesh’s accession process.
CONCLUSION
The UK’s decision to leave the EU has created a unique situation in the
WTO:  the country’s position as both a WTO Member and an EU Member
State has resulted in the UK’s Schedule of Concessions being fixed by the
EU.  How the WTO should administratively handle the UK’s need to adopt
a Schedule of Concessions is unclear.
This Note illustrates three potential routes that the WTO may be able
to pursue.  The first proposal recommends that the UK adopt a Schedule of
Concessions using Article XXVI:5(c) of the GATT 1947 as guidance, in
which the UK would submit a new Schedule as Article II of the GATT
1994 and Article XX of the GATS as “other changes” and rectifications to
the current EU Schedule.  The second proposal suggests that the UK
should de facto apply GATT Article XXVI:5(c) and request for accession
under GATT Article XXXIII, which would thus provide the UK the option
not to adopt the EU’s Schedule of Concessions in its current state.  The
third proposal introduces a solution where the UK adopts the EU’s Sched-
ule of Concession through a de facto application of GATT Article
XXVI:5(c), but reserves the right to modify certain provisions within its
Schedule of Concession under Article XXVIII:5 of the GATT 1947.
The third proposal—a de facto application of Article XXVI:5(c) and
tariff modifications under Article XXVIII:5—is the most realistic and
strongest path.  Having the UK only negotiate certain line items in its
Schedule allows the UK to maintain some trade stability while developing
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its own trading position.  This proposal also formally classifies the UK’s
adoption of its Schedule as a tariff modification: a recognized, legitimate
procedure.  Analyzing these three options thus illustrates how important
classifying and labeling the UK’s adoption of a Schedule of Concessions will
be in determining the applicable WTO provision.  Despite these specula-
tions, however, how the WTO will actually proceed in handling Britain’s
unique situation remains a mystery.  The UK’s future legal status as a trade
nation will be undetermined once the country formally begins the process
of triggering Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty and withdrawing its member-
ship from the EU.
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